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Abstract
We derive a simple mathematical “theory” to show that two decision-making entities
can work better together only if at least one of them is occasionally willing to stay
neutral. This provides a mathematical “justification” for an age-old cliche´ among
marriage counselors.
Key words: average; Bayes theorem; probability; ROC curve; synergy; utility.
AMS classification: 62C05.
1 Introduction
Suppose that, for each decision one has to make, there are two possible courses of action, a
good one (G) and a bad one (B). Let h represent a decision-making agent, where h(G) > h(B)
means h favors the good action; h(G) = h(B) means h is neutral; and h(G) < h(B) means
h favors the bad action. In addition, suppose that the payoffs associated with favoring the
good action, being neutral, and favoring the bad action are +1, 0, and −1, respectively. Let
V (h) denote the expected payoff for h. Then,
V (h) = (+1)× P (h(G) > h(B)) + 0× P (h(G) = h(B)) + (−1)× P (h(G) < h(B)). (1)
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Clearly, V (h) is a measure of the tendency for h to favor the good action: V (h) > 0 means
h is more likely to take the good action; V (h) < 0 means it is more likely to take the bad
one; and V (h) = 0 means it essentially acts randomly.
Let h1 and h2 be two decision-making agents, e.g., a husband and wife. In such settings,
it is natural to require (e.g., for concerns of fairness) that neither h1 nor h2 be allowed to
dominate the collective decision. This means their respective votes must be on the same
scale and equally weighted. Without loss of generality, we assume that both h1 and h2 are
binary functions, with hi(x) = 1 meaning that hi voted for action x and hi(x) = 0 meaning
that hi voted against action x. The collective decision is represented by their mean,
h¯ =
h1 + h2
2
.
Definition 1 The collective decision h¯ is said to be synergistic if
V (h¯) ≥
V (h1) + V (h2)
2
; (2)
it is said to have positive synergy if the above inequality is strict.
In what follows, we derive “if and only if” conditions for the collective decision h¯ to be
synergistic and examine the implications of those conditions. Before we proceed, however, it
is first necessary for us to explain why our definition of synergy above should depend on the
specific payoff structure (+1, 0,−1) that gave rise to the expression V (h) in equation (1).
1.1 Connection to existing literature: ROC curves
Our choice of V (h) is deeply related to the so-called receiver-operating characteristic (ROC)
curve (Pepe 2003), a concept widely used in many scientific fields such as signal detection
and medical diagnostic tests.
In the context of medical diagnostic tests, let h(x) be a measurement taken on the patient
x. Suppose the test declares x to be “sick” if h(x) < c for some threshold c, and “healthy”
if h(x) ≥ c. The test is not perfect. For a given c, some healthy patients are declared “sick”
(false positives), while some sick patients are declared “healthy” (false negatives).
It is easy to see that decreasing the threshold c will always reduce the false positive
rate but increase the false negative rate of such a test, while increasing the threshold c will
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always reduce its false negative rate but increase its false positive rate. For example, in
the extreme case of c = −∞, nobody is declared “sick” so there can be no false positives,
but the false negative rate reaches 100% since everyone is declared “healthy” including all
truly sick individuals. The situation is similar but reversed in the other extreme case of
c = +∞. There is an inherent trade-off between the two types of errors — reducing one
always increases the other, and the optimal choice of c depends on their relative costs.
The ROC curve essentially traces the two types of errors over the entire range of c, and
the area under the ROC curve, or simply “area under the curve” (AUC), is a commonly used
performance metric for evaluating these diagnostic tests. The AUC has the advantage of not
depending on the relative costs of the two types of errors. In addition, it has the following
interesting probabilistic interpretation (Hanley and McNeil 1982; Pepe 2003): Suppose H
denotes the set of all healthy patients, and S denotes the set of all sick patients. Then,
AUC(h) ≡ 1× P (h(G) > h(B)) +
1
2
× P (h(G) = h(B)) + 0× P (h(G) < h(B)) (3)
for any randomly chosen G ∈ H and B ∈ S. If P (h(G) = h(B)) = 0, meaning h does not
produce ties between healthy and sick patients, this is simply the “folklore” statement that
AUC(h) is the probability that the test h correctly orders healthy patients ahead of sick
ones. The factor “1/2” means ties are broken at random.
It is easy to see from (1) and (3) that
V (h) = 2AUC(h)− 1.
In other words, our expected payoff V (h), as defined in (1), is merely a linearly transformed
version of the widely-used AUC for evaluating the effectiveness of medical diagnostic tests.
One can think of V (h) as measuring the ability of h to “diagnose” the good action when
faced with a decision.
2 Results
We now state two lemmas for respectively the independent and dependent cases. Together,
they establish necessary and sufficient conditions for the collective decision h¯ to be syner-
gistic. Proofs of the two lemmas are given in the appendices. However, the punchline of the
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paper, which we state in Section 3, is a consequence of these two lemmas, rather than the
two lemmas themselves.
2.1 Independent case
First, suppose h1 and h2 act independently. For i = 1, 2, let
ai = P (hi(G) > hi(B)),
bi = P (hi(G) = hi(B)),
ci = P (hi(G) < hi(B)).
In other words, ai is the probability that hi favors the good action; bi is the probability that
hi is neutral; and ci is the probability that hi favors the bad action.
Lemma 1 Suppose h1 and h2 are statistically independent. Then, h¯ is synergistic if and
only if
b1(a2 − c2) + b2(a1 − c1) ≥ 0. (4)
Corollary 1 For h¯ to be synergistic, it is sufficient (but not necessary) for both a1 ≥ c1 and
a2 ≥ c2.
Since V (h1) = a1 − c1 by (1) and likewise for h2, the conclusion here is simply this: the
collective decision is synergistic as long as both decision makers are “no worse than random”,
having a slightly higher chance of favoring the good action rather than the bad one.
2.1.1 Connection to existing literature: Weak learners
The notion of being “no worse than random” is analogous to that of a “weak learner”
(Schapire 1990), an important concept in PAC learning theory (Valiant 1984) and the theory
of boosting (Freund and Schapire 1996).
2.2 Dependent case
More generally, suppose that h1 and h2 are not independent. For clarity, we make a small
change in the notation to describe this case, using lowercase letters a, b, c for the marginal
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probabilities of h1, and uppercase letters A,B,C for those of h2:
a = P (h1(G) > h1(B)), A = P (h2(G) > h2(B));
b = P (h1(G) = h1(B)), B = P (h2(G) = h2(B));
c = P (h1(G) < h1(B)), C = P (h2(G) < h2(B)).
Furthermore, since h1 and h2 are dependent, we use PxX to refer to the conditional prob-
abilities of h2 given h1, and QY y to refer to the conditional probabilities of h1 given h2, as
displayed in Table 1. These notations for P and Q are analogous to those typically used to
denote transition probabilities for Markov chains (Ross 1997).
Of course, P and Q are related by Bayes theorem (Bayes 1763). For example,
P (h2(G) = h2(B)|h1(G) < h1(B)) = ...
=
P (h1(G) < h1(B)|h2(G) = h2(B))× P (h2(G) = h2(B))
P (h1(G) < h1(B))
(5)
or, using the compact notations of Table 1,
PcB =
QBc ×B
c
, or cPcB = BQBc.
This leads to the following proposition, which is needed in order to prove Lemma 2 that
follows.
Proposition 1 For x = a, b, c and Y = A,B,C, xPxY = Y QY x.
Lemma 2 Suppose h1 and h2 are statistically dependent, with conditional probabilities given
by Table 1. Then, h¯ is synergistic if and only if
b (PbA − PbC) +B (QBa −QBc) ≥ 0. (6)
Corollary 2 For h¯ to be synergistic, it is sufficient (but not necessary) for both PbA ≥ PbC
and QBa ≥ QBc.
Notice the similarity and symmetry of the two “if and only if” conditions, (4) and (6). They
can both be interpreted as follows: “Whenever one decision maker is neutral, the other one
is more likely to favor the good action rather than the bad one.” Clearly, this is a highly
intuitive characterization of the notion of synergy.
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Table 1: Conditional probabilities. (I) PxX denotes various conditional probabilities of h2
given h1. (II) QY y denotes various conditional probabilities of h1 given h2. For example,
PaB = P (h2(G) = h2(B)|h1(G) > h1(B)), QBc = P (h1(G) < h1(B)|h2(G) = h2(B)), etc.
(I)
h2(G) > h2(B) h2(G) = h2(B) h2(G) < h2(B)
h1(G) > h1(B) PaA PaB PaC
h1(G) = h1(B) PbA PbB PbC
h1(G) < h1(B) PcA PcB PcC
(II)
h1(G) > h1(B) h1(G) = h1(B) h1(G) < h1(B)
h2(G) > h2(B) QAa QAb QAc
h2(G) = h2(B) QBa QBb QBc
h2(G) < h2(B) QCa QCb QCc
3 Conclusion
It is easy to see that the inequality (4) will become an equality when b1 = b2 = 0. The same
can be said for inequality (6) when b = B = 0. These cases correspond to the situation
where neither h1 nor h2 is ever neutral about a decision.
Definition 2 A decision-making agent h is said to be opinion-loaded if its probability of
being neutral is zero, i.e., if P (h(G) = h(B)) = 0.
Theorem 1 There can be no positive synergy in the collective decision h¯ if both decision-
making agents are opinion-loaded.
Our results, therefore, imply that there can be no positive synergy in the collective
decision without individual neutrality. In other words, the willingness to compromise is not
an option; it is a necessity!
Intuitively, this is because opinion-loaded decision-makers are never willing to admit
that they may sometimes have a hard time making a good decision. As a result, they don’t
give the other decision-maker a chance to take over the decision when it can be beneficial to
do so; this explains why there can be no positive synergy. In order for there to be positive
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synergy at all, it is necessary for at least one agent to have a strictly positive probability of
remaining neutral.
For centuries, marriage counselors must have been giving such advice to couples all over
the world, but they may not be aware of the mathematical justification for their age-old
practice.
A Proof of Lemma 1
Since both h1 and h2 are binary functions, h¯(G) > h¯(B) if and only if
(i) h1(G) > h1(B) and h2(G) > h2(B); or
(ii) h1(G) > h1(B) and h2(G) = h2(B); or
(iii) h1(G) = h1(B) and h2(G) > h2(B).
That h1 and h2 are statistically independent means
P (h¯(G) > h¯(B)) = a1a2 + a1b2 + a2b1. (7)
Likewise,
P (h¯(G) < h¯(B)) = c1c2 + c1b2 + c2b1. (8)
Using the definition (1) and (7)-(8), we get
V (h¯)−
V (h1) + V (h2)
2
= [(a1a2 + a1b2 + a2b1)− (c1c2 + c1b2 + c2b1)]−
(a1 − c1) + (a2 − c2)
2
= a1a2 − c1c2 +
(
b2 −
1
2
)
(a1 − c1) +
(
b1 −
1
2
)
(a2 − c2). (9)
Since ai + bi + ci = 1 for i = 1, 2, (9) becomes
a1a2 − c1c2 +
(
1
2
− a2 − c2
)
(a1 − c1) +
(
1
2
− a1 − c1
)
(a2 − c2)
= (a1a2 − c1c2) +
a2 − c2
2
− (a2 + c2)(a1 − c1) +
a1 − c1
2
− (a1 + c1)(a2 − c2)
=
a2 − c2
2
+
a1 − c1
2
− (a1a2 − c1c2)
=
1
2
[(a2 − c2) + (a1 − c1)− 2(a1a2 − c1c2)]︸ ︷︷ ︸
(∗)
,
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where
(∗) = [(a2 − c2)− (a1a2 − c1c2)] + [(a1 − c1)− (a1a2 − c1c2)]
= [(1− a1)a2 − (1− c1)c2] + [(1− a2)a1 − (1− c2)c1] . (10)
Finally, using the fact that ai + bi + ci = 1 for i = 1, 2 again, we see that (10) is equal to
[(b1 + c1)a2 − (a1 + b1)c2] + [(b2 + c2)a1 − (a2 + b2)c1]
= b1a2 − b1c2 + b2a1 − b2c1
= b1(a2 − c2) + b2(a1 − c1),
which proves the lemma. 
B Proof of Lemma 2
By the same argument used to start the proof of Lemma 1,
V (h¯)−
V (h1) + V (h2)
2
= [(aPaA + aPaB + bPbA)− (cPcC + cPcB + bPbC)]−
(a− c) + (A− C)
2
. (11)
But
A = aPaA + bPbA + cPcA and C = aPaC + bPbC + cPcC ,
so (11) is equal to
(aPaA + aPaB + bPbA)− (cPcC + cPcB + bPbC)− ...
...−
(a− c)
2
−
(aPaA + bPbA + cPcA)− (aPaC + bPbC + cPcC)
2
.
Gathering terms multiplying a, b, and c, respectively, this becomes
a
(
PaA + PaB −
1 + PaA − PaC
2
)
+ b
(
PbA − PbC −
PbA − PbC
2
)
− ...
...− c
(
PcC + PcB −
1− PcA + PcC
2
)
. (12)
Using the fact that
PaA + PaB + PaC = 1 and PcC + PcB + PcC = 1,
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expression (12) can be simplified to
a
PaB
2
+ b
(
PbA − PbC
2
)
− c
PcB
2
. (13)
However, by Proposition 1, we have
aPaB = BQBa and cPcB = BQBc.
Substituting this into (13) leads to the conclusion that (11)≥ 0 if and only if
b (PbA − PbC) +B (QBa −QBc) ≥ 0. 
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